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Prosecutor v.Dragan Nikolic´: Decision on
DefenceMotion on Illegal Capture
JAMES SLOAN*
Abstract
In November 1994 the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY),
indicted its ﬁrst accused, Dragan Nikolic´. It was not until over ﬁve years later, however, in
April 2000, that he was ﬁnally arrested and transferred to TheHague. The circumstances of his
arrest – which reportedly featured his being violently abducted from his home in the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) by Serbian criminals before being transferred to the NATO-led
Stabilization Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina and, ultimately, to the ICTY in The Hague –
were the subject of a pre-trial motion. Nikolic´’s defence counsel asserted that the nature of
his capture was such that the appropriate remedy was to dismiss the charges against him and
order his return to the FRY. Theymade this assertion despite an admission, for the purposes of
the motion, that the captors lacked any connection with SFOR or the ICTY. The trial chamber
rejected themotion. In reaching its decision, the trial chamber considered fundamental issues
about what constituted an illegal capture for the purposes of the ICTY and, without explicitly
doing so, appeared to reject the view of the Court in Eichmann that a person may not oppose
his being tried by reason of the illegality of his capture.
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1. INTRODUCTION
On the evening of 21 April 2000, the alleged war criminal Dragan Nikolic´ was il-
legally1 abducted in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) by unknown captors,
smuggled across the Drina River and into Bosnia and Herzegovina and then handed
over towhat is reported to have been aUS contingent2 of theNATO-led Stabilization
* Lecturer in Public International Law at the University of Glasgow School of Law. The author is grateful to
Catriona Drew for providing extremely helpful comments on an earlier draft.
1. It is agreed by the parties to theMotionunder discussion thatNikolic´’s abductorswere ‘convicted of offences
(presumably under FRY law) in relation to the accused’s transfer to Bosnia-Herzegovina by the district court
in Smederevo, FRY’. (See Prosecutor’s Response to ‘DefenceMotion Based Inter Alia Upon Illegality of Arrest
Following Upon the Prior Unlawful Kidnapping and Imprisonment of the Accused and Co-related Abuse of
Process Within the Contemplation of Discretionary Jurisdictional Relief Under Rule 72’ ﬁled 17 May 2001,
31 May 2001 (hereafter, Prosecutor’s Reply of 31 May 2001, at para. 5.) The question of whether his capture
was illegal in international law was, in part, the subject of the Decision under discussion herein.
2. Z. Cvijanovic and V. Zimonjic, ‘Belgrade Crackdown: Bounty hunters strike inside Serbia to seize war crimes
suspects’, Independent, 18 May 2000, 14.
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Force (SFOR).3 He was immediately transferred by SFOR to the International
CriminalTribunal for the formerYugoslavia (ICTY)4 inTheHague,wherehepleaded
not guilty to all charges against him.5 As the Indictment against him currently
stands,6 he is chargedwith eight counts of crimes against humanity, alleged to have
been committed during 1992, largely in his capacity as commander of the Susica
detention camp in easternBosnia andHerzegovina.Nikolic´, the ICTY’s ﬁrst indictee,
had been at large since his Indictment was conﬁrmed in November 1994.7
This note considers a Decision of 9 October 2002,8 in which Trial Chamber II of
the ICTY rejected two defence motions challenging the trial chamber’s jurisdiction
over Nikolic´ in view of the nature of his capture9 and calling for the dismissal of the
Indictment against him and his release and return to the FRY.10
The effect of an accused’s irregular capture on the jurisdiction of the ICTY is not
a new issue; it has arisen twice before without conclusive result. In the ﬁrst such
case, Prosecutor v. Mile Mrksic´ et al.,11 the accused Slavko Dokmanovic´ sought his
release based on the fact that he was lured by the Tribunal’s Ofﬁce of the Prosecutor
(OTP)12 fromtheFRYintoUN-administeredCroatia,wherehewasarrested.13 Because
the trial chamber rejected Dokmanovic´’s claim that his arrest was in violation of
international law, it ruled that it did not have to ‘decide . . . whether the International
3. SFOR is the successor to the NATO-led Implementation Force in Bosnia (IFOR). ‘IFOR (now SFOR) was
established by NATO in December 1995 pursuant to the Dayton Peace Agreement and under the authority
of the United Nations Security Council’. See Prosecutor v. Blagoje Simic´, Milan Simic´, Miroslav Tadic´, Stevan
Todorovic´ and Simo Zaric´, Decision onMotion for Judicial Assistance to be Provided by SFOR andOthers, Case
No. IT–95–9-PT, T. Ch., 18 Oct. 2000 (hereafter Decision on Todorovic´ Motion for Judicial Assistance of 18
Oct. 2000, at para 39).
4. Also referred to as ‘the Tribunal’ or ‘the International Tribunal’.
5. At his initial appearance on 28 April 2000.
6. Nikolic´ was initially indicted for 24 counts of crimes against humanity, violations of the laws or customs
of war and grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions (see Prosecutor v. Dragan Nikolic´ a/k/a/ Jenki, Case No.
IT–94–2-I, Indictment, 1 Nov. 1994). This indictment was conﬁrmed by a trial chamber on 20 October 1995,
with the result that an international arrest warrant was issued and transferred to all states. See Review of
the Indictment Pursuant to Rule 61 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, 20 October 1995, as discussed
in Prosecutor v. Dragan Nikolic´, Decision on Defence Motion Challenging the Exercise of Jurisdiction by the
Tribunal, Case No. IT–94–2-PT, T.Ch. II, 9 Oct. 2002 (hereafter, Decision of 9 Oct. 2002), at para. 12. The
indictment has been twice amended, most recently on 7 Jan. 2002.
7. Initially he was residing in the Bosnian Serbian held part of Bosnia and Herzegovina, where the authorities
did not recognize the Tribunal. By February 1999,when anAmended Indictmentwas conﬁrmed,Nikolic´ had
apparently relocated to the FRY. See ibid., at paras. 13 and 14.
8. Ibid.
9. The initial motion, Motion for Relief Based Inter Alia Upon Illegality of Arrest Following Upon the Prior
Unlawful Kidnapping and Imprisonment of the Accused and Co-related Abuse of Process Within the Con-
templation of Discretionary Jurisdictional Relief Under Rule 72, 17May 2001 (hereafter Defendant’s Motion
of 17May 2001), was supplemented andmodiﬁed by a secondmotion,Motion toDetermine Issues as Agreed
Between the Parties and the Trial Chamber as Being Fundamental to the Resolution of the Accused’s Status
Before the Tribunal in Respect of the Jurisdiction of the Tribunal under Rule 72 and Generally, the Nature
of the Relationship Between the OTP and SFOR and the Consequences of any Illegal Conduct Material
to the Accused, His Arrest and Subsequent Detention, 29 Oct. 2001 (hereafter Defendant’s Motion of
29 Oct. 2001).
10. See Defendant’s Motion of 17May 2001, ibid., at para. 1.
11. Prosecutor v.Mile Mrksic´, Miroslav Radic´, Veselin Sˇljivancˇanin and Slavko Dokmanovic´, Case No. IT–95–13a-PT.
12. Also referred to as ‘the prosecutor’ or the ‘prosecution’.
13. His arrest was effected bymeans of a ‘sting’ operation carried out jointly by the OTP and the United Nations
Transitional Administration for Eastern Slavonia, Baranga andWestern Irimium (UNTEAS).
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Tribunal has the authority to exercise jurisdictionover a defendant illegallyobtained
from abroad’.14
In the second case, Prosecutor v. Blagoje Simic´ et al.,15 the alleged facts surrounding
the arrest of one of the accused, Stevan Todorovic´, were strikingly similar to those
alleged by Nikolic´. Todorovic´ claimed he had been captured in the middle of the
night by armed,maskedmenwho gagged, blindfolded, and beat himwith a baseball
bat16 and then proceeded to smuggle him out of the FRY and into Bosnia and
Herzegovina17 – and into thewaiting arms of SFOR.18 Through a complicated series
of motions,19 Todorovic´ obtained a decision ordering SFOR and the NATO states
participating in SFOR to disclose to him information relating to the circumstances
of his capture. This caused serious concern among the participating states,20 which
claimedthattheordereddisclosurewouldcompromisetheconﬁdentialityofNATO’s
operational methods. Ultimately, the OTP withdrew all but one of the 27 charges
againstTodorovic´; in return,Todorovic´pleadedguilty to thesingle remainingcharge
and agreed not to pursue the ordered disclosure.
In thetwopreviouscases, therefore, the trial chamberwasnotrequiredtoconsider
the difﬁcult issue of whether the nature of an accused’s capture affected the ICTY’s
jurisdiction. In the light of this, and given the importance of such a ruling to the
other indictees who have been brought before the ICTY through similar irregular
methods,21 it was with some anticipation that the trial chamber’s decision on the
Nikolic´ Motion was awaited.
2. THE AGREED FACTS AND ISSUES
In the Todorovic´ matter, the defence strategy appeared to be twofold: to bring a
seemingly endless stream of motions and to attempt to gain access to sensitive
and potentially embarrassing information held by SFOR regarding its possible
involvement in his capture. Although the approach appeared to cause the OTP
14. Emphasis in original. See Prosecutor v. Mile Mrksic´ et al., Decision on the Motion for Release by the Accused
Slavko Dokmanovic´, Case No. IT–95–13a-PT, T. Ch., 22 Oct. 1997, at para. 78.
15. See Decision on Todorovic´ Motion for Judicial Assistance of 18 Oct. 2000, supra note 3. The issues raised in
this case are considered in greater detail in J. Sloan, ‘Prosecutor v. Todorovic´: Illegal Capture as an Obstacle to
the Exercise of International Criminal Jurisdiction’, (2003) 16 LJIL 85–113.
16. At his initial appearance before the ICTY on 30 Sept. 1998 he advised the trial chamber that he ‘did not feel
well because he had received a heavy blow with a baseball bat over his head “during the kidnapping”’. See
Prosecution Response to the Appeal Brief of the Accused/Appellant Stevan Todorovic´, ﬁled 4 Aug. 1999, at
para. 9, n. 8.
17. See S. Castle, ‘Bosnian Police Chief May Escape War Crimes Trial’, Independent, 16 Aug. 2000, 11. See also T.
Walker, ‘SAS Carried Out Serbian Raid’, The Times, 11 Nov. 1998, 15.
18. SFOR then transferred the accused immediately to the ICTY in The Hague.
19. For a discussion of the nature of Todorovic´’s motions and the issues raised therein, see Sloan, supra note 15,
at 88–93.
20. On 2 Nov. 2000, a series of communications was received by the ICTY fromNATO and several of its member
states calling for a review of the decision ordering disclosure and for its stay. (See Prosecutor v. Blagoje
Simic´, Milan Simic´, Miroslav Tadic´, Stevan Todorovic´ and Simo Zaric´, Decision and Scheduling Order, Case No.
IT–95–9-PT, A. Ch., 8 Nov. 2000.)
21. For a list of accused who have been brought before the ICTY through the intervention of SFOR, see S. Lamb,
‘The Powers of Arrest of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia’, (1999) 70 BYIL 167,
at 167, n. 3.
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considerable frustration,22 it did lead to some measure of success for Todorovic´ in
that all but one of the charges against him were ultimately dropped.23 In contrast,
defence counsel for Nikolic´ were a model of co-operation in their dealings with the
OTP. Indeed it was they who proposed24 that certain factual assumptions be agreed
upon by the parties25 for the purposes of the Motion,26 rather than attempting to
obtaindisclosure fromSFOR.27 TheapproachofNikolic´’s counsel,which (at least ini-
tially) avoided a Todorovic´-style evidentiary hearing,28 was welcomed by the OTP,29
which had unsuccessfully called for such an arrangement in the Todorovic´matter.
In addition, the parties to theMotion reached agreement on the legal issues to be
determined in theMotion. They were as follows:
1 If it can be established by the accused that the accused’s arrest was achieved by any
illegal conduct committed by, or with the material complicity of: (a) any individual
or organization (other than SFOR, OTP or the Tribunal); (b) SFOR; (c) OTP; or (d) the
Tribunal, would the accused be entitled to the relief sought?
2 Does SFOR act as an agent of the OTP and/or the Tribunal in the detention and arrest
of suspected persons?30
22. The OTP described the motions brought by Todorovic´ as ‘many and various’ and the litigation itself as ‘long
and tortuous’. See Prosecutor’s Response to StevanTodorovic´’s ‘Notice ofMotion for JudicialAssistance’,ﬁled
8 Dec. 1999, at para. 11.
23. Note, however, that OTP ofﬁcials took the position that ‘absolutely nothing had been sacriﬁced’ in that case.
Cf. J. Cogan, ‘International Criminal Courts and Fair Trials: Difﬁculties and Prospects’, (2002) 27 Yale J. Int’l
L. 111, at 127, where he noted the ‘rather [unconvincing]’ nature of this assertion by the OTP.
24. See Defendant’s Motion of 17May 2001, supra note 9, at para. 3.
25. See Decision of 9 Oct. 2002, supra note 6, at para. 21, where the trial chamber noted the following agreed
facts:
– that the Accused at the time of his apprehension was living in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia;
that the Accused was taken forcibly and against his will and transported into the territory of Bosnia
and Herzegovina;
– that theapprehensionandtransportation into the territoryofBosniaandHerzegovinawasundertaken
by unknown individuals having no connection with SFOR and/or the Tribunal;
– that the accused in his interview with the prosecution asserted that he was handcuffed and in the
boot of a car, when the unknown individuals handed him over to SFOR;
– that in Bosnia and Herzegovina the accused was arrested and detained by SFOR;
– that subsequently the accused was delivered into the custody of the Tribunal and transferred to The
Hague; and
– that certain individuals have been tried and sentenced in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia for the
acts relating to the apprehension of the Accused.
26. This proposal appears tohave been in response to the suggestionof a pre-trial judge at a 30March2001 Status
Conference. SeeDecisionof9Oct. 2002, ibid., atpara. 5.Asnotedbycounsel forNikolic´, oneof theobjectivesof
proceeding in theway they didwas ‘to avoid the quagmire of enquiry, allegation and counter-allegation that
typiﬁed the approachof theparties inTodorovic´ ’. (See ‘Notice ofAppeal fromthe Judgement, pursuant toRule
108 of the Rules of Evidence and Procedure, of Trial Chamber II dated the 9th day of Oct. 2002 concerning
the Defence Motion Challenging the Exercise of Jurisdiction by the Tribunal, ﬁled by the Defendant on
7 November 2002’ (hereafter Defendant’s Notice of Appeal of 9 Oct. 2002), at para. 3).
27. This position was taken by the defence ‘on a without prejudice basis with regard to any future position it
may decide to adopt on the question of disclosure’. (See Prosecutor’s Reply of 31 May 2001, supra note 12, at
para. 10, n. 9 and Decision of 9 Oct. 2002, supra note 6, at para. 6.).
28. ATodorovic´-style hearingwas, in the viewof theOTP, to be avoided as it ‘may impinge upon the vital national
security interests of third States and/or multinational forces in the ﬁeld’. Ibid., at paras. 10 and 11.
29. Ibid., at para. 11. The approach was presumably welcomed by SFOR and its member states as well, as it
allowed them, at least initially, to remain outside the picture (where they very much wanted to be in the
Todorovic´ case).
30. See Decision of 9 Oct. 2002, supra note 6, at para. 18, and Defendant’s Motion of 29 Oct. 2001, supra note 9, at
para. 1.
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3. THE DECISION
The trial chamber divided its reasoning into two parts. First, it considered whether
the conduct of the alleged kidnappers could be attributed to SFOR or the OTP.
It then turned to the question of whether there was a legal impediment to its
exercise of jurisdiction stemming from ‘the fact that the Accused was brought
into the jurisdiction of the Tribunal by SFOR and the Prosecution after his alleged
illegal arrest in the territory of the FRY and transfer to the territory of Bosnia and
Herzegovina by some unknown individuals.’31
3.1. Adoption, attribution, and agency
The concession by the defence that, for the purposes of the Motion, there was no
connection between Nikolic´’s capture and SFOR or the Tribunal made its attempt
to attribute the conduct of his captors to the ICTY or SFOR difﬁcult indeed. Nev-
ertheless, the defence attempted to link the irregular nature of the capture to the
Tribunal in two ways. First, it argued that ‘by not only ignoring the illegality but,
by actively taking advantage of the situation and taking into custody the accused,
SFOR’s exercise of jurisdiction over Nikolic´ was an adoption of the illegality – of
which theywereaware–andthus, anextensionof theunlawfuldetention’.32 Second,
the defence argued that this allegedly illegal conduct on the part of SFOR should be
attached to the Tribunal, based either on SFOR’s status as ‘both the de facto and de
jure agent of the Prosecution’33 or, alternatively, on the OTP having ratiﬁed SFOR’s
conduct.34
Both arguments were unsuccessful. First, the trial chamber rejected the defence
argument that the captors’ allegedly illegal acts could be attributed to SFOR. In this
regard it relied on Article 11 of the International Law Commission’s 2001 Articles
on State Responsibility,35 which speaks of conduct ‘that the State acknowledges and
adopts . . . as its own’.36 In ﬁnding that SFOR did not acknowledge and adopt the
conduct,37 thetrialchamberstressedthefactthatwhenanaccusedcame‘intocontact
with’ SFOR,38 it was obliged to detain and transfer the accused to the Tribunal under
31. See Decision of 9 Oct. 2002, supra note 6, at para. 73.
32. Ibid., at para. 32, quoting fromDefendant’s Motion of 29 Oct. 2001, supra note 9, at para. 12.
33. See Decision of 9 Oct. 2002, supra note 6, at para. 32, relying onDefendant’sMotion of 29October 2001, supra
note 9, at paras. 7–11.
34. See Defendant’s Motion of 29 Oct. 2001, supra note 9, at para. 10: ‘the subsequent conduct of the OTP and/or
Tribunal was such that the conduct of SFOR was in effect ratiﬁed and made as if it had been previously
authorized’.
35. ArticlesontheResponsibilityofStates for InternationallyWrongfulActs,UNDoc.A/CN.4/L.602/Rev.1 (2001).
36. Ibid., at Article 11, referred to in the Decision of 9 Oct. 2002, supra note 6, at para. 60 et seq.
37. Decision of 9 Oct. 2002, supra note 6, at para. 67.
38. This test triggered SFOR’s legal authority to detain an accused (ibid., at para. 54). See also ibid., at para.
52, where the trial chamber discussed the Rules of Engagement adopted by the North Atlantic Council
(NAC) on 16 Dec. 1995, which provide that SFOR ‘should detain any persons indicted by the International
Criminal Tribunal who come into contact with SFOR/IFOR in its execution of assigned tasks’. See also the
trial chamber’s discussion of the legal framework governing the activities of SFOR, ibid., at paras. 35–47.
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the Tribunal’s Statute39 and Rules.40 The trial chamber concluded that through its
conduct, ‘SFOR did nothing but implement its obligations under the Statute and the
Rules of this Tribunal’.41 As to the second aspect of the defence’s argument – that
SFOR’s ‘illegal’ conduct could be attributed to the OTP through agency or the OTP’s
ratiﬁcation of SFOR’s acts – the trial chamber held that this was moot in the light
of its ﬁnding that the illegal conduct of Nikolic´’s captors could not be attributed to
SFOR, ‘for lack of acknowledgement and ratiﬁcation’.42
3.2. The trial chamber’s jurisdiction over the accused: issues ofmale captus
It is well known that two, alternate approaches have been followed by state courts
when dealing with accused brought before them by means of illegal inter-state
capture. Byoneapproach,whichmaybe summarizedby themaximmale captus,male
detentus,43 the national court would refuse jurisdiction where the circumstances
of the accused’s capture were sufﬁciently irregular. Among the reasons given by
these national courts for refusing jurisdiction in such circumstances have been the
following:
(i) the rule of law;44
(ii) the integrity of the executive branch (it must not be rewarded for illegal
behaviour);45
(iii) the integrity of the judicial branch;46
39. Art. 29 (2)(d) of the Statute, which provides that states have an obligation ‘to arrest and detain persons’, has
been held to apply to SFOR as well (see Decision of 9 Oct. 2002, supra note 6, at para. 49, relying on the
Decision in Todorovic´ Motion for Judicial Assistance of 18 Oct. 2000, supra note 6, at 18–19.
40. Rule 59 bis (A) of the Tribunal’s Rules of Procedure and Evidence speaks of ‘an order for the prompt transfer
of the accused to the Tribunal in the event that the accused be taken into custody by that authority or
international body . . . ’ . (See the ICTY’s Rules of Procedure and Evidence, as quoted in the Decision of
9 Oct. 2002, supra note 6, at para. 55).
41. See Decision of 9 Oct. 2002, supra note 6, at para. 67.
42. Ibid., atpara. 68.Asnotedby the trial chamber, ‘Whatever the relationshipbetweenSFORandtheProsecution,
no attribution to the Prosecution can take place’ (ibid., at para. 69).
43. ‘In the view of the Defence, this Tribunal should apply the principle of male captus, male detentus, meaning
that an irregularity has occurred in the arrest of the Accused and therefore should bar any further exercise
of jurisdiction by the Tribunal’ (ibid., at para. 70).
44. See R. v. Horseferry RoadMagistrates’ Court, Ex parte Bennett, [1994] 1 AC 42 (House of Lords), as quoted in ibid.,
at para. 87, where Lord Bridge of Harwich noted, at 67, that there is
no principle more basic to any proper system of law than the maintenance of the rule of law itself.
When it is shown that the law enforcement agency responsible for bringing a prosecution has only
been enabled to do so by participation in violations of international law and of the laws of another state
in order to secure the presence of the accusedwithin the territorial jurisdiction of the court, I think that
respect for the rule of law demands that the court take cognisance of that circumstance.
45. SeeR. v.Hartley (NewZealand, Court ofAppeal), [1978] 2NZLR199, as quoted inDecision of 9Oct. 2002, supra
note 6, at para. 88, where the court, at 216, spoke of not ‘turning a blind eye to action of the New Zealand
police’, which it considered to be an abuse of power. See also State v. Ebrahim, 95 ILR 417, [Judgement of
26 Feb. 1991 of the South Africa, Supreme Court (Appellate Division)], as quoted in Decision of
9 Oct. 2002, supra note 6, at para. 90, where the court noted, at p. 442, that when ‘the State is itself party to a
dispute, as for example in criminal cases, it must come to court “with clean hands” as it were’. See also the
Zimbabwe case of State v. Beahan, 1992(1) SACR 307 (A), as quoted in Decision of 9 October 2002, supra note
6, at para. 93, where, at 317, the court cautioned against ‘encouraging States to become law-breakers in order
to secure the conviction of a private individual’.
46. See Beahan, supra note 45, as quoted in Decision of 9 Oct. 2002, supra note 6, at para. 93, where the court, at
317, noted that ‘in order to promote conﬁdence in and respect for the administration of justice and preserve
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(iv) the fairness of the legal process;47 and
(v) respect for state sovereignty.48
Under the secondapproach,whichmaybe summarizedby themaximmale captus,
benedetentus, the ‘courtmayexercise jurisdictionoveranaccusedpersonregardlessof
how that person has come into the jurisdiction of that court’.49 This latter approach
is perhaps best illustrated by the Eichmann case50 before the Israeli courts, where
it was held that, despite Eichmann’s arrest in contravention of Argentinean and
international law, he could be legally tried. In the words of the Court, ‘It is an
established rule of law that a person being tried for an offence against the laws of a
state may not oppose his trial by reason of the illegality of his arrest or the means
whereby he was brought within the jurisdiction of that State.’51
Counsel for Nikolic´ argued that the male captus, bene detentus approach had lost
much of its relevance and should no longer be applied.52 They further alleged that
because the forcible removalofNikolic´ fromtheFRYresulted in the seriousbreachof
international law, evenabsent the involvementof SFORor theProsecution,Nikolic´’s
release and the dismissal of the indictment against him were the only appropriate
remedies. For its part, theOTPdidnot exactly champion themale captus, bene detentus
approach: it merely argued that national precedents ‘do not present a consistent
picture of the validity, or not, of themaxim . . . ’ .53 Instead, its approachwas to argue
that even if the male captus, male detentus approach was favoured in national law, it
was inapplicable in Nikolic´’s case because his capture did not violate international
law.54
While not explicitly endorsing the male captus, male detentus approach over that
ofmale captus, bene detentus, the trial chamber did appear to disapprove of the latter
the judicial process from contamination, a court should decline to compel an accused person to undergo
trial in circumstances where his appearance before it has been facilitated by an act of abduction undertaken
by the prosecuting State’.
47. See Ebrahim, supra note 45, where the court noted, at 442, that ‘the legal process must be fair towards those
affected by it . . .’ (quoted in the Decision of 9 October 2002, supra note 6, at para. 90).
48. See Ebrahim, supra note 45, where the court noted at 442 that ‘international legal sovereignty must be
respected’ (quoted in the Decision of 9 October 2002, supra note 6, at para. 90). See also Beahan, supra note 45,
where the court noted, at 317, that illegal interstate capture ‘corrodes the peaceful coexistence and mutual
respect of sovereign nations’ (quoted in the Decision of 9 October 2002, supra note 6, at para. 93).
49. See Decision of 9 October 2002, supra note 6, at para. 70.
50. The Attorney-General of the Government of Israel v. Eichmann, (1961) 36 ILR 18 (District Court of Israel) and
(1962) 36 ILR 304 (Supreme Court of Israel).
51. Ibid., District Court at 59.
52. Themale captus, bene detentus approachﬁnds only limited favour innational law,with theUnited States being
one of its main adherents. The best known – andmost controversial – United States case of recent times was
that of United States v. Alvarez-Machain, United States Supreme Court, 504 U.S. 655 (1992). There, Humberto
Alvarez-Machain, a Mexican national, was abducted from Mexico by US ofﬁcials and taken forcibly to the
United States to stand trial for kidnapping and murder. His abduction took place without the permission
of the Mexican government and without regard to the existence of an extradition treaty. For a discussion
of the widespread condemnation of this case both in the United States and internationally, see M. Scharf,
‘The Tools for Enforcing International Criminal Justice in theNewMillennium: Lessons from theYugoslavia
Tribunal’, (2000) 49DePaul L. Rev925. See alsoC. Biblowit, ‘TransborderAbductions andUnited States Policy:
Comments onUnited States v. Alvarez Machain’, (1996) 9 N.Y. Int’l L. Rev. 105, at 107.
53. See Decision of 9 Oct. 2002, supra note 6, at para. 72.
54. A further argument by the OTP, that even if the accused’s apprehension did violate international law, the
remedy sought was inappropriate and did not need to be considered by the trial chamber in view of its
ﬁnding that there was no violation of international law, discussed below.
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approach given its clear willingness to look into the nature of the accused’s capture.
Moreover, it speciﬁcally applied aspects of some of the national decisionswhich fol-
lowed themale captus, male detentus approach.55 As we shall now see, the trial cham-
ber considered the bases on which Nikolic´ claimed it should refuse jurisdiction –
(i) breach of the FRY’s state sovereignty; (ii) breach ofNikolic´’s international human
rights; and (iii) breach of the rule of law/abuse of process56 – and concluded that no
such violations had occurred or, if they had occurred, none was sufﬁciently grave
to lead to its refusal to exercise jurisdiction. In considering each alleged irregularity,
the trial chamber placed great emphasis on the agreed position of the parties that
there was no connection between the illegal capture and the OTP or SFOR.
3.2.1. Alleged violation of the sovereignty of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
On the question of the effect of the capture on the FRY’s sovereignty, the defence
conceded that where there was no direct complicity by the forum state in the
abduction (and the abduction instead involved the actions of private individuals)
the law was unsettled as regards the remedy the defence was seeking.57 It therefore
focused its energiesondrawinga linkbetween theconductof theprivate individuals
who undertook Nikolic´’s abduction and the OTP by asserting that the OTP had
subsequently ratiﬁed the conduct.58 It relied on the view of one commentator who
argued that even if the actions of the captors were not authorized by the state
‘ab initio, it is the State that acts as soon as it fails to return the abducted person, but
arrests and prosecutes himand thus ratiﬁes the originally unauthorized acts’.59 This
line of reasoning, which had strong echoes of the attributability argument made
and dismissed earlier,60 was not addressed by the trial chamber. Instead the trial
chamber – perhaps conﬂating matters – focused on the question of whether there
was involvement on the part of SFOR or theOTP in the abduction and, again relying
on the defence admission on this point, concluded that there was not.61 Based on
this ﬁnding, and on its conclusion that the involvement of the executive authorities
of the forum state in the capture was a sine qua non of the decisions of the national
55. For example, it relied on the South African case of Ebrahim, supra note 45, at 442, for the proposition that the
OTPmust come to before the trial chamber with ‘clean hands’. See Decision of 9 October 2002, supra note 6,
at para. 111.
56. See Defendant’s Motion of 29 Oct. 2001, supra note 9, at para. 14.
57. Ibid., para. 15.
58. The defence argued that ‘although the abduction of an individual by private persons may not initially
involve state responsibility, it is submitted that any subsequent ratiﬁcation of the illegal act does establish
state responsibility’ (ibid.).
59. See F. A.Mann, ‘Reﬂection on Prosecution of PersonsAbducted in Breach of International Law’, in Y. Dinstein
(ed.), International Law at a Time of Perplexity (1989), 405 at 408, as quoted in the Defendant’s Motion of
29 Oct. 2001, supra note 9, at para. 15, n. 24. Mann further noted:
Even if the person acting in the foreign territory is not a police ofﬁcer but a private one, subsequent
adoption by the State entails its responsibility. For this reason the suggestion that the infamous
Eichmann was abducted by private volunteers is irrelevant in law, for even if it had been factually
correct . . . the essential fact is that Eichmann was imprisoned, prosecuted, convicted and executed by
the State of Israel which thus endorsed the acts of any private persons involved.
60. See supra notes 35–41, and accompanying text.
61. Indeed, the trial chamber went so far as to infer, based on the assumed facts, ‘that there are no indicia that
SFOR or the Prosecution offered any incentives to [Nikolic´’s captors]’. (See Decision of 9 Oct. 2002, supra
note 6, at para. 101.)
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courts to refuse to exercise jurisdiction,62 the trial chamber concluded that there
had been no breach of the FRY’s sovereignty.
A second reason given by the trial chamber for ﬁnding that the FRY’s sovereignty
had not been breached was that, unlike in the national case law referred to, in the
case at bar there was no violation of an extradition treaty. This point is not clearly
elaborated. Although it is true that there was no need for an extradition treaty
between the FRY and the ICTY given the obligation on all member states of the
UnitedNations to surrender indictedpersons to the ICTY, it is not clearwhat bearing
this observation might have on the discussion – unless the trial chamber takes the
view that an extradition treatywas an essential element in cases where the national
courts refused jurisdiction. The national case law does not, however, bear this out.63
Moreover, to place such importance on the existence of an extradition treaty risks
the implication by the trial chamber that absent such a treaty, the participation of
the forum state in an illegal interstate capture does not breach international law.64
Aﬁnal reasonwhy the trial chamber foundnobreachof theFRY’s sovereigntywas
thedifferent considerations atplay in the relationshipbetween twostateson theone
hand, and between the Tribunal and a state on the other.65 In the former situation it
held, ‘it is of the utmost importance that any exercise of such national jurisdiction
be . . . in full respect of other national jurisdictions’;66 whereas in the latter, different
considerations apply. ‘The role of the Tribunal, as an enforcement measure under
Chapter VII of the UN Charter, is . . . fundamentally different. Consequently, in this
vertical context, sovereignty by deﬁnition cannot play the same role.’67 While it is,
of course, true that different considerationsmust apply as regards relations between
the Tribunal and member states of the UN (clearly the Tribunal could not function
if its relations with states were constrained in the same manner as between states),
it is submitted that there must nevertheless be some limits on the ICTY’s power to
intervene in a state.68 Indeed theDecisionwould have beneﬁted from consideration
62. Ibid., at paras. 101–102. Somewhat disconcertingly, the trial chamber relied on a passage from an article
written by a member of the prosecution staff as being authoritative support for its assertion in this regard.
This does little to further an impression of impartiality on the part of the trial chamber.
63. The most that may be said is that the violation of an extradition treaty violation may be a factor in the
decisions of national courts (see supra notes 44–48). In the inﬂuential case of Bennett, supra note 44, Lord
Grifﬁths, at 62, was deliberately silent on the question of whether he would have refused jurisdiction in the
absence of an extradition treaty.
64. Without regard to the broader obligations on states under the UN Charter and customary international
law to respect the principles of state sovereignty and non-intervention (see, for example, Case Concerning
the Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America), Merits,
Judgement of 27 June 1986, [1986] ICJ Rep. 14).
65. See Decision of 9 Oct. 2002, supra note 6, at para. 100.
66. Ibid.
67. Ibid. In obiter dictum on this point, the chamber noted that even if it had found there to be a violation of state
sovereignty ‘the Accused should ﬁrst have been returned to the FRY, whereupon the FRY would have been
immediately under the obligation of Article 29 of the Statute to surrender the Accused to the Tribunal’. Ibid.,
at para. 104. The signiﬁcance of this observation is not clear. Of course the FRY would be obliged in such
a case immediately to surrender the accused – just as it had been so obliged since the arrest warrant was
sent to it in 1999. What Nikolic´ appeared to be hoping, however, was that it would, once again, ignore this
obligation.
68. One such limit might, for example, be that any interference in a state’s sovereignty must be speciﬁcally
provided for in the Statute of the ICTY.
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of whether there are such limits on the ICTY, and, if so, what they are and whether
Nikolic´’s capture in violation of the law of the FRY violated them.
3.2.2. Alleged violation of human rights and the rule of law/due process69
The trial chamber consideredNikolic´’s allegations of violations of his fair trial rights
and of the rule of law/due process together.70 As regards the former, the defence
invokedNikolic´’s rightnot tobedeprivedofhis libertyother thaninaccordancewith
a procedure established by law,71 and relied in this regard upon several decisions
of the UN Human Rights Committee.72 The trial chamber, however, rejected the
approachunder the international treaties, once again based on the concession of the
defence that therewas no connection between the capture and theOTP or the SFOR.
As noted by the trial chamber, in all the cases referred to by the defence, ‘the States
against which the applications were lodged were themselves involved in the forced
abductions of the victims’.73
Thedefence further argued thatNikolic´’s rightshadbeenviolatednotwithstanding
the absence of a role of either the OTP or SFOR,74 and relied in this regard on the
Barayagwiza case from the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda.75 Here the
Appeals Chamber held that a trial chamber had the discretion to decline to exercise
its jurisdiction in cases where ‘serious and egregious violations of the accused’s
right would prove detrimental to the court’s integrity’76 regardless of ‘which entity
or entities were responsible for the alleged violations of the Appellant’s rights’.77
The trial chamber in Nikolic´ referred to this decision, noting that even without any
involvement by SFOR or the OTP it would be ‘extremely difﬁcult to justify the
exercise of jurisdiction over a person if that personwas brought into the jurisdiction
of the Tribunal after having been seriouslymistreated’.78 Nevertheless, it found that
.69. See Defendant’s Motion of 29 Oct. 2001, supra note 9, at para. 17, where the defence noted: ‘It is submitted
that while an abduction is per se both an abuse of process and a breach of the rule of law the subsequent
transfer of a defendant as a direct consequence of an abduction into a different jurisdiction to face criminal
proceedings is . . . an abuse of process’. In considering this basis, the trial chamber focused on the procedural
aspect of the claim.
70. On the basis that the factors that play a role in the determination of each issue were similar, as were the
arguments in relation to each (ibid., at para. 106.)
71. As provided for at Art. 9(1) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) (‘Everyone
has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest or detention. No
one shall be deprived of his liberty except on such grounds and in accordance with such procedure as are
established by law’.) and Art. 5(1) of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) (‘Everyone has the
right to liberty and security of the person. No one shall be deprived of his liberty save . . . in accordancewith
a procedure prescribed by law . . . ’ .)
72. See Decision of 9 Oct. 2002, supra note 6, at para. 113, and its reference in n. 122 to Almeida de Quinteros
and Quinteros Almeida v. Uruguay, Communication No. R24/107, Decision of 21 July 1983, Lopez v. Uruguay,
Communication No. R12/52, Decision of 29 July 1981, Celiberti de Casariego v. Uruguay, Communication No.
R13/56, Decision of 29 July 1981 and Canon Garcia v. Ecuador, CCPR/C/43/D/319/1988.
73. See Decision of 9 Oct. 2002, supra note 6, at para. 113.
74. ‘TheDefence . . . submitsthatsincetheabductionwasunlawful, theexerciseof jurisdictionovertheindividual
becomes irregular aswell, regardless ofwhether the abductionwas State-sponsored or undertakenbyprivate
individuals’ (ibid., at para. 108).
75. Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza v. Prosecutor, Decision of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, A. Ch., 3
Nov. 1999.
76. See Decision of 9 Oct. 2002, supra note 6, at para. 108, quoting Barayagwiza, supra note 75, at para. 74.
77. Ibid., para. 114, quoting Barayagwiza, supra note 75, at para. 73.
78. Ibid., at para. 114.
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the particular circumstances of Nikolic´’s capture did not present an impediment to
its exercise of jurisdiction:79
Here, the Chamber observes that the assumed facts, although they do raise some
concerns, do not at all show that the treatment of the Accused by the unknown
individuals amounts [sic] was of such an egregious nature.80
4. CONCLUSION
Nikolic´’s lack of success in the motions81 appears to have been linked in no small
way to the decision on the part of the defence counsel to agree to assumed facts and,
in particular, to agree that Nikolic´’s captors in the FRY were ‘unknown individuals
having no connection with SFOR and/or the Tribunal’.82 It is somewhat puzzling
that the admission was made in the ﬁrst place, given that it would be exceedingly
unlikely that either Nikolic´ or his counsel could have had knowledge regarding
the presence or absence of such a connection. Moreover, the admission does not
appear to be reconcilable with parts 1(ii), (iii), and (iv) of the agreed-upon issues,
where the complicity of SFOR, the OTP, and the Tribunal as a whole are called into
question.83 Furthermore, the agreement appears to have precluded a Todorovic´-style
Plea Agreement with the OTP – at least initially – as disclosure from SFOR was not
required in theMotion.
If the accused had claimed that there was a connection between either the OTP
or SFOR and the capture, the result on the issue of alleged illegality could well have
been different.84 In such a case, a discussion would probably have emerged along
the lines of that in the Todorovic´ case, as to whether the OTP and/or SFOR’s conduct
could properly be likened to that of the executive authorities of a forum state.85 If
79. The trial chamber noted that it ‘must undertake a balancing exercise in order to assess all the factors of
relevance in the case at hand and in order to conclude whether, in light of all these factors, the Chamber
can exercise jurisdiction over the Accused’ (ibid., at para. 112). The chamber’s starting point in this balancing
process, was its earlier conclusion, based on the agreed upon facts, that ‘the acts of the unknown individuals,
i.e. bringing the Accused against his will from the territory of the FRY into the territory of Bosnia and
Herzegovina, cannot be attributed to SFOR or the Prosecution’ (ibid., at para. 113).
80. Ibid., at para. 114.
81. On 9 Jan. 2003 the Appeal Chamber of the ICTY, Judge TheodorMeron presiding, dismissed an interlocutory
appeal by Nikolic´ against the Decision. (See Decision on Notice of Appeal, 9 Jan. 2003.) The reasons for the
denial of the interlocutory appeal were technical ones, with the majority of the Appeals Chamber ﬁnding
that the appeal had been brought under thewrongRule of Procedure and Evidence of the ICTY.Nevertheless,
if Nikolic´ is able to obtain the permission of the trial chamber under Rule 73 for an interlocutory appeal, the
matter may yet go to the Appeals Chamber before his trial commences.
82. See Decision of 9 Oct. 2002, supra note 6, at para. 21.
83. See supra note 30, and accompanying text.
84. See Decision of 9 Oct. 2002, supra note 6, at para. 114, where the trial chamber held that:
in a situation where an accused is very seriously mistreated, maybe even subjected to inhuman, cruel
or degrading treatment, or torture, before being handed over to the Tribunal, thismay constitute a legal
impediment to the exercise of jurisdiction over such an accused. This would certainly be the case where
persons acting for SFOR or the Prosecution were involved in such very serious mistreatment. (emphasis added)
85. See Separate Opinion of Judge Robinson in the Decision on Todorovic´ Motion for Judicial Assistance of
18 Oct. 2000, supra note 3, where, at para. 6 and n. 2, he likened the role of SFOR ‘to that of a police force in
some domestic legal systems’, and noted that ‘it virtually operates as an enforcement arm of the Tribunal’.
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so, the trial chamber’s reasoning – that sovereignty had not been breached because
of the absence of participation by the forum state in the capture – would no longer
apply. Nor would its reasoning that the cases applying the international human
rights standardswere inapplicable to theNikolic´ case due to the lack of involvement
by the forum state.
The fact that the trial chamber laid great stress on the importance of the OTP’s
obligations under international human rights standards86 may have been its way
of limiting the precedent value of the Decision to the strict circumstances of the
case – that is, where the defence concedes the absence of connection between the
OTPorSFORand the irregular capture.Moreover, the trial chamber’s emphasis on its
obligation toensuredueprocessof lawand its endorsementof someof theprinciples
expressedby thenational courts following themale captus,male detentusapproach87 –
speciﬁcally its comment that the prosecution is obliged to come before a trial
chamber of the ICTY with ‘clean hands’88 – might be taken as an indication of how
it would rule if the OTP and/or SFORwere implicated in the capture.
5. POSTSCRIPT
After having its original appeal dismissed on 9 January 2003 on procedural grounds,
the defendant requested and received certiﬁcation for leave to appeal from the trial
chamber on 20 January 2003. On 5 June 2003 the Appeals Chamber, Judge Theodore
Meron presiding, dismissed the defendant’s interlocutory appeal.89 While space
constraints do not permit a discussion of this decision – which was issued after this
note had been ﬁnalized – its reasoning may be brieﬂy noted. The Appeals Chamber
spokeof theneedtoweigh,ontheonehand, theprincipleof state sovereigntyandthe
fundamental human rights of the accused against society’s legitimate expectation
that universally condemned offences be brought swiftly to justice, on the other.90
The weighing process did not favour the defendant. Moreover, in the view of the
Appeals Chamber, in the circumstances, nothing turned on whether or not the
conduct of the kidnappers was attributable to SFOR. It ruled that even assuming that
the conduct of the accused’s captors should have been attributed to SFOR and that SFORwas
responsible for a breach of the human rights of the accused and/or a breach of the sovereignty
of the FRY, there was no basis upon which the Appeals Chamber should decide to
refuse to exercise jurisdiction.91
86. Noting that the norms in the ICCPR and the ECHR ‘only provide for the absolute minimum applicable [to
the ICTY]’. (See Decision of 9 Oct. 2002, supra note 6, at para. 110.)
87. Ibid., at para. 111, where the trial chamber observed: ‘In that context, this Chamber concurs with the views
expressed in several national judicial decisions, according to which the issue of respect for due process of
law encompasses more than merely the duty to ensure a fair trial for the Accused. Due process of law also
includes questions such as how the Parties have been conducting themselves in the context of a particular
case and how an Accused has been brought into the jurisdiction of the Tribunal.’
88. See Decision of 9 Oct. 2002, supra note 6, at para. 111, relying on Ebrahim, supra note 45.
89. Prosecutor v. DraganNikolic´, Case No. IT-94-2-AR73, Decision on Interlocutory Appeal Concerning Legality of
Arrest, A.C., 5 June 2003.
90. Ibid., at paras. 26 and 30.
91. Ibid., at paras. 27 and 33.
